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IS ‘BLACK’ A SENSATION? 
BY JAMES WARD. 
The majority of experts answer in the afirmative, but the plain 
The latter position brieJy stated : darkness and blackness dis- 
Examination of the reasons advanced for the former position :- 
There i s  no exact parallel between darkness and stillness; but only 
because blackness hris become a ( secondary quality’ of objects. The 
‘ dark-$eld’ only extended wh,en interpreted as visually empty space. 
Helmholtz on  the whole favours the neyative character of black. 
Theories to explain bluck on the assumption of its positive 
character :- 
Hering’s theory starts f r o m  the facts of  contrast,’ but these not 
incompatible with the negative cimracter of black ; implies a ‘ blinding 
black’ ; inconsistencies in his treatment of achromatic and chromatic 
antagonism; his medium grey ut variance with the facts of visual 
adaptation ; cannot be identijed with the darkness of the adapted eye 
as his theory requires; the assimilative process said to underlie black 
not proven. 
Wundt’s eclectic expositions : black as the limit of a n  intensive 
series; black as positive and tJbe qualitative opposite of white, Jrst con- 
stant in intensity and then variable ; black as an  anabolic, inhibitory 
process which i s  yet a n  independent one. 
G. E. Miiller’s theory : a n  attempt to remedy the defects of Hering’s ; 
accounts for the series of greys by variations in a n  endogenous 
‘ medium grey’ which result f r o m  retinal excitations; this assumption 
seemingly insuficient to meet the facts; its physiological improbability; 
its ‘ singularity’ not really explained. 
Conclusion: desirable to let the facts speak for themselves; the older 
and simpler view not yet exploded. Hering has corrected Helmholtz 
but has not yet established his own theory : its dificulties awaken the 
suspicion that the atsumption of the positive character of black as a 
sensation is false. 
man, when the question i s  understood, in the negative. 
tinguished as negative sensation and positive perception. 
Is <Black’ a Sensation? 
To this question an affirmative answer would be given as a matter 
of course by everybody unversed in psychological enquiries, and this 
answer most psychologists and physiologists nowadays seek to confirm 
by more or less elaborate arguments. Such unanimity seems to con- 
stitute a strong presumption of truth. But if any layman were asked 
whether he has any visual sensation in the dark he would equally 
without hesitation answer in the negative, and would explain that when 
he talks of seeing black he means what in psychological language would 
be described as perceiving a black object. After all then the plain man 
and the experts take opposite sides ; and though the presumption would 
still be in favour of the latter, if there were no dissentients among them, 
the position of the minority, backed up as it is by common sense, may 
fairly claim consideration-the position, namely, that we do not see or 
sense ‘black’ as something positive in itself, but only perceive black 
things or forms. The position itself can be stated in a few sentences, 
but the arguments for the counter position require discussion in detail. 
The primitive sensation of sight, it is assumed, consists only of the 
single quality we call ‘ light,’ a quality which ranges in intensity from 
the zero of complete darkness-as an ideal limit-up to a dazzling 
brightness that becomes painful and blinding. The first responses to 
light stimulation seem to be very much on a par with our own to 
diffused heat or cold: some creatures seek the light and others avoid i t ;  
the worm, for example, on a sudden flash of light withdrawing into its 
hole, and the Pholas into its shell. As little as our temperature sense 
yields us a perception of form does the light sense, at this level, yield 
any. Only when the stage of visual spatial perception is reached, and 
some discrimination of form is possible, do black and white attain the 
meaning they bear for us. I n  ordinary language-primarily a t  any 
rate-we apply these terms only to shapes or ‘ things ’: to use Helmholtz’s 
terminology, they are ‘body-coloursl.’ A coloured object can only be 
perceived when its colour differs from that of the surrounding visual 
field : so far black as a ‘ secondary quality ’ is on & par with other colours 
and for practical purposes would be equally entitled to the name, even 
if there were black objects devoid of all lustre and absolutely absorbent 
of light. But there is still an  important difference: in a light-field 
many colours may be distinguished, but in a dark-field none. Though 
it is correct to speak of perceiving a black object, must we not then 
maintain that the object, so far as it is really black, yields us directly 
Physiologisehe Opt ik .  2. Ausg. S. 322. 
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no sensation ? Its so-called ‘ black ’ colour answers only to a portion of 
the dark field, and with this causa dejiciens on the sensation level-to 
adopt an apt compzrison of Meinong’s-there corresponds a positive 
percept only because some form or other is demarcated by the rest of 
the visual field which does yield positive sensations. Similarly the piper 
is said to ‘ feel ’ the holes in his whistle when actually he only touches 
the solid metal in which they are pierced ; or the soldier is said to hear 
the tattoo though he has no auditory sensation of the silence intervening 
between successive taps on the drum. An obvious means of differen- 
tiating between ‘ positive ’ and ‘ negative ’ sensations here suggests 
itself:-The order i n  which the first occur is immaterial, but the second, 
that is the absence of certain sensation, can only be experienced when 
preceded by their presence. We can begin either with, say, rough or 
smooth, bass or alto, red or blue. We cannot begin by experiencing 
the impalpable, the inaudible, or the invisible. 
Is  there then any justification for speaking of visual sensations 
without luminosity: must we not rather maintain that in darkness, 
subjectively and objectively absolute, we should not see black, since we 
should not see a t  a l l?  No doubt we are prone to identify the two 
concepts, darkness and blackness, for what we may call their sensory 
content is the same-viz. the absence of visual sensation. 
Even Helmholtz seems to do this, regardless of his own distinction 
between variations of light-intensity and body-colours. “ Black is nu 
actual sensation,” he says, “ i e .  perception of a definite state of our organ, 
even though it is brought about by total absence of light’.” A black 
state may be brought about in a photographic film by the presence of 
light ; would Helmholtz have said that it is to this state that our organ 
is brought by the absence of light and that the perception of both is 
alike ? Not only is i t  obviously inaccurate to speak of blackness as a 
state of the eye, but even the propriety of calling darkness such a state 
is very questionable. What i t  naturally occurs to everyone to ask, 
however, is why the resting state of the eye is said to be accompanied 
by a positive sensation when nothing of the kind is asserted of the like 
state of other sensory organs. By parity of reasoning it would seem we 
ought to maintain that silence is a positive sensation of sound. But 
d priori considerations, it must be allowed, are not decisive here: i t  is 
a question of fact. True, i t  is replied, and as a matter of fact darkness 
is not the concomitant of a resting state of the visual apparatus, and 
Physiologisehe Optik. 2te Ausg. 5. 324. 
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thus there is no parallel between darkness and stillness. Leaving 
physiological questions aside for the present, let us see what are the 
psychological grounds for denying this parallelism. 
“It seems to overlook a very essential point,” says Professor Stumpf. 
“There .remaifis the great difference, that the ear in the absence of 
external stimulation at all events approximates to the limit of not 
hearing, while in the analogous case of the eye, the like by no means 
happens.. ..We see nothing, i.e. no external objects-that is clear, but we 
are far from admitting that we do iaot see in the sense in which we 
admit this as regards our back or  our feet. We are just  as distirictly 
conscious of a sight sensation as we are when the eyes are open, but of 
sensations of hearing, when it is still, we are in the first instance not 
conscious at all. The retinal black caniiot be described as an extremely 
feeble sensation; and there is no need, as in the case of the faintest 
sounds, for highly strung attention in order to perceive i t  a t  all. The 
deepening of black makes the sensation rather stronger than weaker, 
whereas in the transition to deeper silence, the intensity of the sensation 
decreases’.” It is certain that in the dark we should not admit that we 
cannot see in the sense in which we admit this as regards our hands and 
feet. The fact that we are directly aware whether our eyes are in the 
dark or not establishes this difference, but is no proof that darkness is 
as distinctly as light a positive sensation. Mutatis mutandis, the same 
may be said of hearing. When there is nothing to hear we do not say 
that we do not hear in the sense in which we my this of hands and feet. 
The difference between privative terms and negatives is surely obvious. 
Certainly ‘retinal black,’ ; f i t  is a sensation at all, cannot be described 
rn a feeble one. The interest and the constancy of visual sensations 
throughout waking life naturally make their cessation impressive and it 
must be admitted that the cessation of sounds is not often equally 
strikinga. But whether it is true that it is harder to convince oneself 
that a particular darkness is absolute than that a particular silence is 
so, is surely an open question, and perhaps not an important one. At  
any rate when we make the attempt what we are intent upon in the 
one case is light and in the other sound ; and if’ these are not completely 
absent both alike become fainter as we approach the limit, while the 
1 Tonpsychologie, I. S. 381. 
* Yet there are some cases in which it is, and then everybody speaks of the cessation 
as audible. It is this perception of silence that ‘wakes the miller when his wheel stops and 
the clerk when the sermon is ended. Cf. McDougall, “ Young’a Theory of Light- and Colour- 
Vision,” Mind, N.S. x. p. 96. 
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deepening, whether of darkness or silence, if these are sensations at all, 
yields a stronger rather than a weaker sensation. We cannot fairly 
parallel the diminishing sounds in the one case and the increasing 
darkness in the other. But it is doubtless true-and this perhaps is 
the point underlying Professor Stumpf‘s reasoning-that black has an 
objective significance to which silence furnishes no analogue : hence we 
have no special term for objects that emit no sound and indeed no 
experience of such. It is only too easy to  confound this positive 
significance for perception with positive reality for sensation, as ordinary 
thought and language invariably do; and it is difficult to avoid the 
suspicion that even psychologists of Professor Stumpf‘s eminence’ have 
been misled by this confiision into begging the question they mean to 
prove. 
We seem to have only an instance of this confusion in the following 
further statement of Helmholtz :-“ We are very well aware when the 
eyes are closed that the black field of sight has a boundary ; we by no 
means allow that i t  extends away behind our back‘.” But when, as 
here, we are dealing exclusively with sensations, we have no right to 
talk either of a ‘field’ or a boundary. Such terms imply spatial per- 
ception. A sensation may have more or less extensity but this finite 
quantity is not the same as bounded space. The extensity of a sensa- 
tion, like its intensity, is intrinsically limited, not extrinsically, that is 
to say it is not bounded: a mere sensation of a certain extensity does 
not ‘ march ’ with another of like or different modality. What we are 
immediately aware of, when we close the eyes on a pitch-dark night is 
not absolute black, since the internal retinal light is still present ; and 
so long as we attend to this and its continual changes so long we are 
aware of positive sensations and a certain extensity. But to disregard 
this, as we commonly do in speaking of such a state as ‘ total darkness,’ 
and yet to ask where this darkness is localised and what it includes or 
excludes, seems unmeaning. Still at least it must have some extensity, 
1 An equally eminent physiologist-Professor v. Kries, 60 fur us he shares the coinmn 
opinion-seems to lay himself open to a like suspicion. “ Unbiassed introspection will 
never allow black to count as a lower degree of intensity of the sensation of white,” he 
says in one place; but in another, “The unbiassed will always be inclined here also 
[when the eyes are closed] to speak of a cessation of seeing, as absence of sensation (Nicht- 
empjnden).” Both statements are true : to the unbiassed mind, black is positive, i.e. for 
perception, and darkness negative, i . e .  for sensation; but the uubiassed mind would prefer 
to say not that black is a lower degree of the sensation of white, but that dark is a lower 
degree of the sensation of light. Cf, Nagel’s Hundbuch der Phpiologie, III. pp. 146,273. 
a Op. cit. 8. 424. 
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it may be said. Certainly, provided it have some quality and intensity, 
but this is the first question. But in truth extension and not mere 
extensity was what Helmholtz meant ; the word he uses is ‘ sensation 
of black,’ the fact he describes is the perception of a black ‘ field.’ And 
everyone must allow that when we have advanced to this perceptual 
level we can discriminate the form of a black object on a white ground 
as well as that of a white object on a black one ; and if, when the white 
object fills the whole field, this is still regarded as extended, why, it 
may be urged, should not the same hold of the dark field ? But even 
so, if no positive sensation pertains to a black object, why should any 
be assigned t o  the black-field ? What more have w e  than a percept of 
visually empty space? It seems useless then to attempt to find an 
answer to our question by appealing to perception’ A reference to the 
definition of field of sight which Helmholtz gives in the section devoted 
to perception (pp. 673 K) is conclusive evidence of its perceptual 
character. I n  this section too there is a later passage, which, if it 
stood alone, would be entirely satisfactory:-“ The sensation of darkness 
is the sensation of the resting state,-or if it be preferred-is the 
absence of sensation in parts of our nervous apparatus for vision, which 
would be excited if a stimulus were applied to them. To it there 
corresponds in perception the idea ( V o ~ ~ t e l l u n g )  of parts of space in 
front of’ us, that send out no light to our eye; which therefore implies 
a definite, though also negative, predication concerning the objective 
state of this portion of space,” p. 71’1. Equally explicit is the following 
passage-& propos of Hering-added to the second edition :-“ This per- 
ception that a sensation [of light] that might be present, at the moment 
is not, involves after all a predication concerning the existing state of 
the organ ... and in this sense we designate that state too a sensation, 
viz. one of darkness,” p. 379. On the whole Helmholtz may fairly be 
counted on the side of the minority. 
Professor Hering is the chief champion of black as a positive 
sensatmion, and he at least is clear of the confusions just referred to 
between sensation and perception. For him the body-colour black 
The dark-field is presumably 
coextensive physiologically with the retina-is bounded, that is to say, by the OTU serratu- 
whereas the light-field falls within this. To this physiological difference there is an 
answering psychological difference. What we may call the spatially developed portion of 
the light-field, to which alone the term ‘field’ is appropriate-more particularly that 
portion the projection of which is ascertained by means of the perimeter-has a positive, 
though not sharply defined, boundary in the sensational fringe into which it rapidly 
merges. 
1 Moreover, the parallel supposed is by no means exact. 
This boundary is lacking to the dark-field as such. 
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is a positive sensation because in his opinion the facts of light-induction 
and contrast compel us to regard darkness as one. The so-called 
sensation of the deepest black he has shown to be possible only under 
the influence of light. White and black are then, he argues, on a par: 
in so far as the retina must be partially illuminated if the deepest black 
is to be seen (empfunden). The only difference is that in the case of 
black the influence of the light is indirect-a most important difference 
surely. I n  the dark, that is to say in the absence of all external 
stimulation, there is always present more or less internal stimulation- 
the so-called intrinsic light of the retina (Eigenlicht). Let us suppose 
we succeed in finding a dark grey to match this: a strip of such grey 
on a white ground yields a sensation that is darker still. I n  place of 
the psychological effect of contrast to which Helmholtz alone appealed 
in explanation of this fact, Hering lays stress on the ‘negative induction’ 
of the white grouud as a purely physiological effect : the strip does not 
merely seem darker by contrast but the sensation actually is ‘darker’ in 
itself. But Hering does not expressly deny the presence of psycho- 
logical contrast as one factor in the result: a t  any rate this is 
unquestionable. The simplest statement we can make of the psycho- 
logical effect of the ‘ negative ’ and seemingly inhibitory neural process, 
and the statement most in accord with the facts of sensation generally, 
is to say that this effect too is negative: the sensation is reduced still 
further towards the zero of absolute darkness and the contrast so much 
the more enhanced. The fact that part of this total effect is due to the 
indirect physiological influence of the light stimulus simultaneously 
present is, so far as psychological description is concerned, wholly 
irrelevant. Leaving physiological differences aside, we can at  least 
clearly imagine a parallel in the case of sound, which would hold good 
psychologically a t  all events. Suppose we hear a loud sound of constant 
intensity and quality and simultaneously a much fainter one of different 
quality. Let the intensity of‘the latter steadily diminish and the contrast 
in intensity between the two sounds will steadily increase ; and there is 
d pr ior i  no reason why we should not attribute this growing contrast to 
the increasing stillness of the waning sound. That there are empirical 
reasons why we do not is undeniable; but these reasons are more 
physical than psychological. Muteness or ‘ insonance ’-to coin a word- 
is not a secondary quality of objects as blackness is, nor do auditory 
sensations develop spatial perception as visual sensations do. But it is 
not difficult to imagine modifications in the two senses-and perhaps in 
the environment-which would bring about an exchange of rdle, and 
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then i t  would be natural to  regard blackness as negative and muteness 
as positive. Whereas seeing is preeminently the space sense, so hearing 
is above all the time sense, and here accordingly silence does assume a 
rdle analogous to that of darkness in the case of space. So we find 
Preyer saying : “ J u s t  as black is a sensation indispensable to painting 
so are pauses indispensable sensations for music1 ” ; and Mach, followed 
by v. Ehrenfels, paralleling time-shapes with space-shapes’. 
But Hering, who starts by considering not the sitnple fact of dark- 
ness itself but the more complex fact of its contrast with white, is led 
to regard it not as a decrease in, or the zero of, luminosity, but as a 
positive intensity increasing towards the maximum which he calls pure 
black, and as thus completely on a par in respect of reality with its 
contrary, pure white. Even if this were true, it is very questionable 
whether the fact of psychological contrast would be any proof of it-and 
of contrasts other than psychological we have no right to speak. I n  
physiology and physics the appropriate term, and also the usual one, is not 
contrast, but opposition or antagonism : both of which, of course, imply 
two real processes. But contrast is possible when only one member of the 
relation is positive and amwers to an existing stimulus, the other being 
its zero and answering to none. The change in consciousness is equally 
impressive and positive-as a change-whichever way it occurs. A blind 
man is unaffected by the sudden alternation of light and darkness : to 
experience darkness we must experience light too. But how does this 
prove that darkness is a sensation of equal intensity but opposite quality 
to lights? Yet this is Hering’s view. The difficulties it entails are 
many and great. 
I n  the first place, as Fechner and Fick have urged, if black and 
white, darkness and light, are alike positively intense, why are they 
not equally exciting and exhausting 2 A patient with sensitive eyes, 
to whom a faint light is painful, might only make bad worse- 
momentarily at any rate-by shutting out the light altogether. Light 
admits of indefinite increase, but who will maintain the like of dark- 
ness : who ever heard of a blinding black‘ ? 
1 UebeT die Grenzen der Tonwahrnehmung, 1876, 8. 67. 
2 Mach, Die Analyse der Empjndungen, 1” Aus. 1886, 8. 104; v. Ehrenfels, “Ueber 
Gestaltqualitaten,” Vierteljahrsehr. f .  wissenschaft. Phil. 1890, 8. 263. 
3 It does not follow, as Professor G. E. Miiller seems to argue (Zeitschr. f. Psych. 
u.. 8 .  w .  XIV. S .  25 f.), that because in the case of colour-contrast diverse qualities are 
involved, therefore they must enter also into brightness-contrasts, and mere difference 
will not suffice. 
4 It is true that Hering substitutes Deutlichkeit for Intensitat, but this--as Fechner 
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Secondly, if black and white are in all respects antagonistic, then 
they ought entirely to neutralise each other when combined in a 
certain proportion-as is the case with complementary, or rather, 
antagonistic colours, as Hering prefers to call them. I n  place of 
this, however-though there are no red-greens or yellow-blues-there 
is a continuous scale of black-whites, and therefore a neutral or medium 
black-white (or grey), in which the two colours concur to an equal 
extent. This difference Hering attempts to explain by the hypothesis 
that red and yellow light act anabolically, green and blue katabolically, 
in producing the corresponding sensations ; whereas all light is kata- 
bolic as regards white. If this were not the case, if mixed sunlight 
acted anabolically-producing black, <as green light produces green- 
and if this anabolic action were as intense as the katabolic which 
yields white, “ then,” says Hering, ‘‘ we should not see such sunlight a t  
all’.” But a t  all events, however produced, this assimilative process 
yielding black, according to his theory, actually exists, and in the 
medium grey it is present to the same extent as the dissimilative 
process which yields white. Why, then, is there any sensation in that 
case, when in the parallel case of two antagonistic colours there is none 
a t  all2? This serious inconsistency, which every critic of Hering’s 
theory has emphasized, would be wholly removed by the recognition 
of the merely negative character of black. But there is another 
difference between the supposed antagonism of black and white on 
the one hand, and that of antagonistic colours on the other. Blue and 
yellow, though antagonistic, are otherwise so far independent that the 
intensity or the saturation of the one may diminish without that of the 
other increasing, or vice versd. Whereas more white involves ips0 fucto 
less black, and vice versd ; and of saturation in connexion with them we 
have no occasion to speak a t  all. This seems to show not only that 
both belong to one and the same process, but to suggest the purely 
negative character of one of the two ; if so, there can hardly be much 
question that black is the one. 
Thirdly, since there are not two intensities of the same grey, Hering 
notes-is only an abuse of terms. If anyone choosea to say that the twilight glimmer 
differs from the noonday glare merely in being less distinctly light, we can only protest. 
The graphical and numerical exposition of his position which Hering gives (Zur Lehre 
vom Lichtsinne, § 22)  shows clearly that he is dealing with what everybody else calls 
intensity. 
’ Zur Lehre vom Lichtsinne, S .  122. 
a The subsidiary hypothesis of ‘specific luminosities’ which Hering afterwards ad- 
vanced, even if verified, would not obviate the difficulty in question. 
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assumes that what we call its intensity is determined ent,irely by the 
relative, not by the absolute, amounts of its black and white con- 
stituents’. Such thoroughgoing relativity, without a parallel elsewhere, 
leads to extraordinary consequences when we come to consider the facts 
of visual adaptation, as Professor G. E. Miiller has already pointed out’. 
The pitch-blackness we experience on first entering a cave disappears 
a t  length as the eyes accommodate themselves ; we then perceive ‘ the 
intrinsic light of the retina,’ which is only a deep grey; on returning 
to  the daylight in like manner the dazzling glare is after a time ex- 
changed for distinct vision as the eyes re-adapt themselves to the 
increased stimulation. In  both cases, then, a stationary state is 
eventually reached, in which, to use Hering’s language, ‘‘ a complete 
balance between assimilation and dissimilation is attained ” ; in both 
cases, that is to say, the ratio of black and white is the same; and 
therefore the sensations ought t,o be identical. The wide difference that 
in fact obtains between them, though a refutation of Hering’s ‘ psycho- 
physical principle,’ shows indeed that there are not two intensities of a 
given grey, regarded as a combination of black and white, as there may 
be two intensities of a given clang. But it also shows that the assimi- 
lative process, which has the same ratio to the dissimilative in both 
cases, cannot be the ‘ cause ’ of a positive sensation of black ; for, if it 
were, there would be two intensities of the same grey. 
Fourthly, the meaning which Hering assigns to ‘ medium grey ’ is 
very different from the ordinary one. The plain man would tell us that 
he knows nothing of a fixed medium grey a t  all, since he knows nothing 
of a fixed, absolute black or white. But, given a certain illumination, 
he would probably understand ‘ medium grey’ to mean the body-colour 
that appeared equidistant between the two taken as the respective 
standards of black and white. For Hering, on the contrary, medium 
grey is not a body-colour a t  all, but what we see “ on awaking during 
the night in a pitch-dark room.’’ The ‘intrinsic light of the retina’ 
that then obtains “ must, according to my theory,” he tells us, ‘‘ be the 
medium grey, for the assimilative and dissimilative processes being 
then approximately equal, the sensation must be about equally distant 
from those of absolute black and whites.” That facts seem t o  contradict 
his theory he candidly allows. But why is the contradiction only 
apparent? Not because it is not really the fact that the darkness 
1 o p .  cit.  8. 55 f. 
a 2ei tschr.f .  Psych. u. 8. w .  XIV. S. 65. 
Op. cit. 5. 88 f. 
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of the adapted eye is nearer to the intensest black we can experience 
than it is to sunlight, but solely because if there were actually light 
rays working assimilatively on the retina with the same intensity as 
that of the rays which work dissimilatively I‘ we should necessarily have 
a sensation of black, which in depth or intensity would exceed quite 
extraordinarily the deepest velvet black actually experienced and be 
altogether blinding.” Yes, ;f; but, as Hering naively adds, “ there are 
no such rays ... and according to my theory there cannot be’.” The 
‘intrinsic light of the retina’ is then a medium grey only in the 
sense of lying midway between absolute white and a “merely con- 
ceivable ’’ absolute black, of which we neither have, nor can have any 
experience. 
Finally, i t  may be doubted whether it is even physiologically con- 
ceivable that an anabolic or constructive process should ever attain the 
intensity possible to a katabolic or destructive one. Moreover, not 
only is it d priori  very questionable on biological grounds’ whether 
anabolical processes ever entail specific sensations at  all ; but., further, 
there is no clear evidence that in fact they do3. If black or darkness 
is a positive sensation there must be a corresponding neural process, 
that is certain ; but Hering’s assumption that this is to be found in the 
assimilative process that makes the sensation of light possible seems to 
be an assumption merely, and an assumption too which the negative 
character of darkness would render altogether needless. It is also 
certain that the dissimilative process must be accompanied or followed 
by an assimilative one ; but again it is an assumption pure and simple 
that there must be an answering sensation, viz. black. 
Since the appearance of Hering’s classical contributions Wundt 
too bas been a prominent champion of black as a positive sens a t‘ ion. 
But if anything were calculated to make an unbiassed reader sceptical, 
it would be the examination of Wundt’s various expositions. I n  the 
earlier editions of his Physiological Psychology he represented the 
whole series-white, grey, black-as simply an intensive series, in 
which white passes through grey into black, ‘ I  its lowest degree.” In 
the later editions, after proceeding as before, he suddenly turns round, 
1 Cf. above the passage quoted on p. 415. 
a Cf. Fick, Sitz. Ber. d. Phyuik. Med.  Ges. zu Wiirzburg, 1900, 8. 9-15; c). E. Miiller, 
Zeitschr. f. Psych. u. 8. w. XIV. S. 74. 
3 In his theory of the temperature-sense Hering in like manner atisumed two antago- 
nistic processes : had this assumption been confirmed by recent experiments, it would 
have afforded some support to the corresponding theory of the light-sense, for cold is 
unquestionably a positive sensation. 
J. of Psych. I 28 
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saying : (‘ Nevertheless, it is unquestionable that at the same time we 
subjectively experience (empjiiden) black and white as qualitative oppo- 
sites‘ ....” Their relation to bright and dark objects may have helped 
to fix the distinction, but is insufficient to account for its origin, since 
we also ascribe black to the dark field of sight, from which all objects 
are excludedz. It is true that Fechner has used the term Augenschwarz 
for what, since Helmholtz, is generally called Eigenlicht. But the term 
in this sense Wundt stigmatizes as “ wholly unwarranted ”: the black 
that he intends is neither “white nor coloured3,” in short, it is the 
absolute black that, according to Hering, we never actually experience 
at all. But now it is surely notoriously not true that we ascribe such a 
black to the ‘dark field,’ and still less true that we do this before we 
come to distinguish objects as black or white. Wundt wholly ignores 
the important difference on which Helmholtz, and even Hering have 
insisted, between mere light or shade as grades of ( luminosity ’ and black 
or white as body-colours or secondary qualities of objects. It is just 
because of this difference that we can ascribe black to a ( bright object ’ 
and white to a ‘ dark ’ one, when-recognizing the objects-we take 
account of their different illumination. That Wundt is unwittingly 
talking the language not of sensation, but of perception, is manifest 
from his phrase, “ ascribe black to the dark-field.” Turning, however, 
to  his description of this sensation in detail, we  come upon fresh 
difficulties. 
First, we have an intensive series, ranging between ( absoliite black ’ 
and ‘ absolute white,’ though, since black is always present, there is really 
no absolute white. The intensity here diminishes with the intensity of 
the light-stimulus till we reach a threshold which is called “ the darkest 
white” (das dunkelste Wpei~s)~, while the final limit of the series is 
called ‘( the darkest black” (das dunkelste Schwur~)~.  What we wonder 
is the relation between these two, and which of them corresponds to 
“ the lowest intensity of’ white ” ‘2 If there are sensible degrees of black, 
wherein can their difference l ie?  If it be in the amount of white 
1 Yet he had himself seriously questioned, and even rejected this view in an earlier 
2 Grundztige der physiologischen Psychologie, 4” Ausg. I. S. 504 ; 5b Ausg. 11. S. 162, 
3 And yet it is always present when a white or coloured impression is sufficiently 
4 Op. eit.  4” Ausg. I. 9.503. This term is omitted in the last edition, though the thing 
work. 
slightly altered. 
diminished, is, in fact, the “lowest intensity-grade of white,” Zoc. c i t .  
is still implied. 
Cf. “Die Empfindung des Lichts und der Farben,” Phil. Stud. IV. S .  360 f. 
Op. cit .  4” Ausg. I. S .  558; 5” Aueg. 11. S. 246. 
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present, and this on the whole we must suppose so long as the light- 
stimulus can be further diminished, then the threshold reached waa not 
the darkest-why not say the blackest?-white. In  that case the 
blackest white must itself be black, the zero limit of the series, as 
Wundt himself has said ; and then i t  only escapes becoming a contra- 
diction by being the nonentity which zero implies. But the series is 
also a qualitative series, Wundt now maintains, and so regarded, black- 
in spite of its being the lowest (or zero) degree of white-is a positive 
sensation, in quality the opposite of white. To say nothing further of 
the anomaly of a sensation that has a positive quality, but no intensity, 
i t  is enough to observe that from the mere fact, if fact it be, that the 
series is a qualitative one it does not follow that both extremes are 
positive. We can imagine a series of tones, for example, rising (or 
falling) continuously in pitch and diminishing continuously in inten- 
sity ; the limit of such a series would be silence, and this, it is allowed, 
is not a positive sensation. But black is equally the limit of innumer- 
able qualitative series, beginning with red, yellow, green, etc. It can 
hardly be a t  once a positive quality and the precise opposite of them 
al l ;  and if it is really the precise opposite of white, this difference 
would only tend to show that the white-black series is a purely 
intensive one, and black its limit or ‘ lowest grade.’ 
Nevertheless, it is, Wundt maintains, an “indubitable fact ” that 
the series is also one of qualitative differences. Let us turn, then, to 
his account of this second aspect of the series and see how it squares 
with the first. In place of beginning with white as a positive quality, 
diminishiug in intensity as the light diminishes till black is reached 
when all light is gone, he now begins with black as a positive quality, 
with which, as such, the presence or absence of light has nothing a t  all 
to do. I t s  physiological counterpart is taken to be “ a  permanent 
internal excitation jinnere Dauererregung) of the retina, which accom- 
panies and outlasts all other excitations ”: hence all our sensations of 
light and colour are mixed with absolute black. At  first Wundt re- 
garded the intensity of this black as constant, attributing all the 
variations of intensity in the black-white I‘ mixture-system,” (Misch- 
system) as he calls it, to varying external light-stimulations : there 
were ‘ I  no independent degrees of intensity in black.” On this hypo- 
thesis the intensive and the qualitative aspects would become iden- 
tical-in other words, the qualitative aspect would become an intensive 
aspect simply-provided the constancy of absolute black were the con- 
stancy of zero. And a very little reflexion will lead most people to 
28-2 
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suspect that an excitation of the retina that is always present, always 
constant, and “ involves no exhaustion ” is an Unding that can only be 
equated to zero’. At  any rate, Wundt himself seems to have come at  
length to this conclusion, for he now-more suo-silently drops his first 
hypothesis, without considering it necessary to refute the argunients he 
had previously advanced in its favour’. But according to his latest 
view the intensity of the black complement in his Mischsystem varies 
as well as that of the white’. But now he ought no longer to refer 
the gradations of the system exclusively to variations in the intensity 
of the external excitations caused by light, as he none the less con- 
tinues to do. I n  fact, there is no longer any warrant for speaking of the 
series as a continuously graduated intensive series at all. For aught 
that appears to the contxary, the intensity of the ‘ system’ may now be 
unifonn, the intensity of one component increasing as that of the other 
diminishes, as Hering indeed assumes. One cannot run with the hare 
and keep with the hounds: Wundt, having at length parted from 
Helmholtz and sided with Hering, must perforce accept the conse- 
quences. For example, there cannot be two intensities of the same 
grey, Wundt says-as we all say-and this is obvious so long as the 
intensity of a given grey is regarded as determined exclusively by the 
intensity of the external excitation. But if we elect to regard the 
black due t,o internal excitation as also a factor and an independent 
one, then we can only maintain that there cannot be two intensities 
of the same grey, if, as Hering does, we are consistent enough to 
maintain also that the character of the grey depends only on the 
ratio, not on the absolute amount, of the two factors. Is Wundt 
prepared for this? 
Matters are not mended when we find that Wundt, like Hering, 
attributes the internal excitation on which black depends to an anabolic 
process, and regards this as inhibitory in its action? But, so far as it is 
inhibitory, the process cannot be a permanent and independent one, as 
Wundt assumes : it must presuppose the external excitation, on which 
the sensation of white depends. And it must neutralise this more 
or less completely6; in a word, its action must be negative, and equally 
1 The sensation corresponding to absolute black will then be “the null-point ” of the 
whole series, and as such Wundt in the very same context actually describes it. 
a Cf. Phil. Studien, IV. S. 365-367. 
J Psychdogie, 5te Ausg. 11. S. 163. 
Op. cit.  5@ Ausg. XI. S. 242, 248. 
8 As already said, Wundt in his article (Phil. Studien, IV. 8. 360 ff.) controverts 
Bering’s view waoerning the primitive antagonism of black and white as sensations; 
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SO the sensation it is supposed to induce. But why a fundamental, 
vital process should yield specific sensations, to say nothing of doing 
this only in the case of‘ a single sense, Wundt, as little as Hering, 
attempts to  explain. 
I n  his remarkable articles Zur Psychophysik der Gesichtsemp- 
jndungen’ Professor G .  E. Muller exposes and endeavours to remedy 
the defects of the Hering theory. But he is so completely in accord 
with Hering on the question now before us that he never for a moment 
pauses to substantiate the claim of black to the character of a positive 
sensation. The “ altogether peculiar phenomenon,” as Wundt allows i t  
to be, that black and white form not merely an intensive but also a 
qualitative series is for him too ‘an indubitable fact’; so much SO 
that in spite of its peculiarity and its difficulties, i t  is one he finds i t  
needless scrupulously to verify. And yet he escapes these difficulties 
as little as his predecessors, although his main concern is “ t o  modify 
the theory of antagonistic colours so as to explain the quantitative 
singularity of the black-white sensations without the help of Hering’s 
unwarrantable [psychophysical] principle* ”-to explain that is to say 
the existence of a graduated series of black-whites (greys), though 
there is no corresponding series of red-greens or yellow-blues, without 
the assumption that one and tlie same grey may result from different 
intensities of black and white, provided their ratio is the same. 
For Hering’s antagonism of anabolic and katabolic processes 
Professor Muller substitutes the more rigorous antagonism of reversible 
chemical or molecular actions ; and whereas Hering leaves it doubtful 
how far his antagonistic processes are peripheral or central, Nuller 
distinctly assumes that his own reversible actions take place both in 
the retina and in the central ‘ visual substance.’ But he distinguishes 
carefully between the processes occurring in the retina proper and in his 
subcortical or cortical retina-as we may fairly call it-on the one hand 
and the nervous processes by which they are connected on the other. 
Further he supposes that during the resting or neutral state all three 
antagonistic processes (white-black, red-green, yellow-blue) presumably 
occur, alike in the retina and in the central visual substance, as a 
consequence of the molecular ‘ collisions ’ due to incessant thermal 
disturbances ; the several antagonistic pairs being very approximately 
and to the last charges him with inconsistency in maintaining this antagonism of black 
and white, while yet regarding grey as a compound of the two. But now we have Wundt 
himself asserting both I 
Op. cit .  XIV. S. 62. Zeitschr. f. Psych. u. a. w .  1896-7, Bde. x. and XIV. 
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in equilibrium and of constant intensity, since the temperature is 
practically uniform. When the balance between two reversible or 
antagonistic reactions in the retina is disturbed, only the intenser of 
the two produces a nervous excitation ; when both are equal therefore. 
the retinal process does not affect the corresponding central process 
at alll. I n  the case of black and white then, when a nervous 
excitation occurs it is one which would of itself give rise either to a 
sensation of white or to a sensation of black, but not to a mixed 
sensation of grey. Thus, if these centripetal excitations were all, we 
should experience pure black and pure white varying in intensity, as 
hot and cold, for example, do; but we should know nothing of a 
graduated series of greys. But on Muller’s theory, as we have just 
seen, they are not all ; in the central visual substance during its resting 
phase the black and white reactions still occur, though they balance 
each other. Here, however, these reactions are not merely physical 
processes as in the case of the retina, but psychophysical; in other 
words, the reactions are ips0 fucto excitations, ‘ endogenous excitations,’ 
as Miiller calls them. Hence the so-called, and in fact if the theory be 
sound the mis-called, ‘self-light’ of the retina or Augengrau. SO 
Miiller works his way to what, like Hering, he regards as the medium- 
grey; but it is a centrally, not a peripherally, excited sensation. 
And now, when say the retinal W (white)-process predominates the 
excitation consequent upon it, on reaching the central visual substance, 
increases the W-process and excitation and diminishes the B (black)- 
process and excitation that are there taking place : so, mutatis mutandis, 
when the retinal B-process predominates. Thus the existence of a 
graduated series of black-whites (or greys) is supposed to be explained. 
But not only are the assumptions underlying this explanation 
questionable; there is also at any rate one difficulty inherent in the 
explanation itself. The series of greys obtained we may represent by 
means of the following figure, in which perpendiculars above XX’ stand 
for white intensities and perpendiculars below for black, MQ being the 
medium grey of the visual centre when free from peripheral excitations. 
So long as the components of this grey last, a series of continuously 
increasing white excitations will yield a corresponding series of light 
greys and a similar series of black excitations a series of dark greys, 
the limit of the oue series being pure white, that of the other pure 
black. But it is reasonable to assume that the intensities of both 
Op. cit .  XIV. S. 21, 26. 
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components of M(7 are small-and Muller himself speaks of them as 
“ possessing a minimal value ( W, + BJ l,” and so i t  is highly probable 
that excitations from the retina may arrive which will practically more 
than exhaust one or other of thetn-in fact if photometric estimates of 
the intensity of the ‘subjective grey’ are any evidence, this would 
certainly happen. In  that case we should have beyond the series of 
MG I’
greys an indefinite series of pure whites of varying intensity on the one 
side and a corresponding series of pure blacks on the other, as indicated 
in the figure. But this would conflict with the other position, viz. that 
the black-white series is wholly a qualitative series or ‘ Mischsystem,’ 
which Muller in common with Hering and Wundt strenuously maintains. 
Indeed he calls the series in distinction from the series of tones “ essen- 
tially limited (prinzipiell begrenzt), because we cannot conceive the 
change consisting in the sensation becoming blacker or whiter prolonged 
beyond pure black and pure white2,” i.e. beyond the lines B and W, 
where the white and black components respectively vanish. Not  only 
are these limits for Muller essentially impassable, but like the rest of 
us, he seems inclined to question whether they are ever even attained, 
whether, that is, w e  ever experience pure white or black at  all3. For 
those who regard the white series as purely intensive there is no 
difficulty in this: it simply means that we have no experience of 
either the zero or the maximum of the series. But for Muller the 
difficulty is serious, assuming, as he does, that excitations having a 
considerable range of intensity but answering only to pure white 
reactions or pure black reactions are sent up from the retina and, 
on arriving a t  the visual centre, are only prevented from becoming 
sensations of pure white or black by admixture with the endogenous 
black or white-described as ‘ minimal’ to start with-which diminishes 
steadily in intensity as their intensity increases. To represent this 
1 op.  c i t .  XIV. s. 35. a op,  c i t .  x. 5. 34. Op. cit .  x. 5. 34, xiv. S .  35 n. 
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diminution as asymptotic (shown by dotted lines in the figure) will not 
practically mend matters; for when in the fraction - s is very 
small compared with w, the value of the fraction is indistinguishable 
from 1. I n  short it would seem that Muller’s theory only avoids the 
difficulties familiar in Hering’s by failing to account for the series of 
greys as we know them. 
But there is another difficulty, and perhaps a more fundamental 
one. Granting that ‘ endogenous ’ W- and B-reactions and -excitations 
take place, why should they-nay, how can they, blend to form grey T 
A ‘ mixed sensation ’ is either psychologically meaningless or it 
answers to what is really a sensation-complex, such as a clang for 
example; and the sole evidence for its complexity is the possibility 
of ‘psychical analysis.’ But grey is not in this sense a mixed 
sensation, it is not psychically analysable into black and white. All 
this Professor Muller admits’. All the mixture there is then is a 
mixture of excitations and it is solely in this psychophysical sense that 
Muller uses the term ‘mixed sensation.’ But how can equal antago- 
nistic excitations combine to produce a positive result instead of 
neutralising each other? ‘If they cannot coexist in the same nerve 
fibre, why should they in the same neuron ? Miiller himself--d propos 
of binocular colour-mixture-seems to admit this difficulty. “ The 
occurrence of a yellow-blue sensation,” he says, ‘ I  is entirely excluded ; 
for that would presuppose that excitations due to antagonistic forces.. . 
could be transmitted together into one and the same beat (BezirL) of 
the nervous systems." But if they cannot be transmitted there how can 
they originate there ? The reactions are reversible chemical or physical 
processes taking place to an equal extent in consequence of irregular 
heat-encounters throughout a substance free from external disturbance : 
that is to say we have a case of dynamic equilibrium, and no external 
work is done. If we imagine a Maxwellian demon ubiquitous throughout 
the substance, to him the reactions might still furnish excitatious, but 
each excitation would be a distinct event: there would be no reason 
for two antagonistic ones to blend. And apparently it is something of 
this sort that Xiiller does imagine, for-after describing the neutral 
state of the visual substance as one in which there is no change of 
energy-he adds, ‘( but in which from the molecular mechanical 
standpoint many things happen that for psychophysics are by no 
W 
w + s  
1 Op. cit .  x. 8. 14. 9 Op. e i t .  XIV. 8. 40. 
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means without significance: on the contrary they form the basis of 
the sensation of subjective grey (Augengrau)’.” 
But the qualitative ‘ singularity ’ of the black-white series is more 
fundamental than its quantitative and involves hardly less difficulty. 
Why are there not also central blends of blue and yellow, red and 
green ? ‘ I  Of course,” Professor Miiller remarks, “ what has been said 
[of the grey series] is by no means meant to exclude the supposition 
that the endogenous excitations of the visual substance in principle 
[im Gmnde]  consist not only of black and white but also of four chro- 
matic excitst,ions as wellz.” But he insists that in point of fact there is, 
normally at all events, no evidence of the existence of these last. 
For the moment, however, we are not concerned with facts but with 
Muller’s theory. The existence of the black and white endogenous 
excitations is hardly yet to be enrolled as a fact, and meanwhile the 
theory that suggests it must be consistent. Muller assumes that the 
‘strong preponderance’ of the endogenous grey is such as to deprive 
the chromatic blends of any appreciable effect. Some preponderance 
there is good ground for assuming in view of the preponderance of 
white in our visual experience generally; bu t  that experience hardly 
suggests a preponderance tliat aniounts to total suppression. In  fact 
we seem forced to choose one of two evils : either the endogenous grey 
holds the field by reason of its great absolute intensity or it is so near 
the threshold that the red-greens and the blue-yellows are below it. In 
the first case the saturation of our colour-sensations would be affected, 
and in the second, as already urged, a complete series of greys would 
hardly be possible. If endogenous excitations occur, as they very ueli 
may, there is no reason to suppose that they differ essentially from the 
internal excitations to which in their absence the retina would give rise. 
Nor is there a t  present any sure means of separating the two. After 
long sojourn in the dark what we are aware of is best described as a 
fine and faint galaxy twinkling in many colours. Muller seems to 
regard his endogenous excitation as a uniform background of medium 
grey for all this ‘light-dust’ or ‘light-chaos,’ as it is sometimes 
called. Wundt’s contention that this background is not grey hut 
black seems nearer the truth, for when, as occasionally happens, one 
discerns starless patches in this ‘ dark-field ’ they seem comparable 
to the blackness produced by ‘contrast ’ in Hering’s experiments. 
The simplest explanation of both, it may be urged, is the temporary 
Op. c i t .  xrv. S. 64, init. op.  C i t .  x. s. 344,jin. 
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cessation or inhibition of the intrinsic light1 : all which makes against 
Muller’s endogenous grey, and supports the more common-sense view of 
the purely negative character of black2. 
Surely the simplest way is to let the facts speak for themselves. 
Blue and yellow are complementary or antagonistic, because they do 
not yield a graduated series by mixture as blue and green do : black 
and white are not complementary or antagonistic because they do yield 
such a series. The series intermediate between blue and green is a 
qualitative series because it depends on variations in two distinct 
stimuli and cannot be produced by varying one alone: the series 
between black and white is not a qualitative series, because it can 
only be produced by variations of the one positive stimulus, internal 
or external, yielding white. Blue and green are both positive 
sensations, because both have assignable stimuli and can occur 
in any order and independently: black is not a positive sensation, 
because it has no assignable positive stimulus and depends solely 
on the cessatiou of light, internal and external. On the whole then 
we may conclude that the older and simpler view that “darkness or 
black is nothing but the result of the state of rest of the whole or part 
of the retina”-as Joharines Miiller puts its-is not yet, exploded, and 
that, for the present a t  any rate, it is therefore premat<ure to claim 
for the opposite view now in vogue the dignity of ‘indubitable fact.’ 
Hering’s many admirable experiments show indeed the insufficiency 
of Helmholtz’s explanations of so-called simultaneous and successive 
‘ contrast ’ ; but the physiological processes. of induction which they 
reveal cannot be said to shut us up to the acceptance of the positive 
character of black till his theory is cleared of the grave difficulties that 
a t  present beset it. It by no means follows that because Hering has 
refuted the Young-Helmholtz theory he Iias, ips0 facto, established his 
own. If black is verily a positive sensation nothing should be easier 
than to show this beyond cavil psychologically and physiologically. 
But this has never been done. To retort that “ t o  define it as the 
1 Cf. MCDougall, “Young’s Theory of Light and Colour-Vision,” Mind, N.S. x. 
pp. 58, 96. 
a A PTOPOS of an experiment which he has described (XIV. S. 35) Professor Miiller 
maintains that it is “altogether inconceivable” (9. 36n.) how this experiment is to be 
explained without assuming the positive character of black. Yet Professor McDougall 
(op. cit.  p. 94) seems to have done this satirfactorily, and even to have turned the tables 
by experiments of his own which give results incompatible with theories of a special 
black-process. 
8 Physiologie, 1846, Bd. 11. S. 296. 
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absence of all light-sensation is as useless as to  define green as the 
absence of all red or the sphere as the absence of every other figure’,” 
is a palpable begging of the question, evidence not of a strong case 
but of a weak one. Nobody would object to defining silence as t,he 
absence of all sound till he had shown beyond question that it was 
something more. Nothing is commoner than to find that an in- 
tractable problem involves a false assumption-like the famous poser 
submitted by Charles I1 to the Royal Society, ‘Why does a kett,le of 
fish weigh more when the fish are dead ? ’ disposed of by the discovery * 
that they don’t. Similarly the problem of black as a positive sensation 
may yet be as simply disposed of by the discovery that it ish’t. 
OR. cit. 8. 63. 
